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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent surge in maritime migration across the Mediterranean Sea has
placed an unprecedented Search and Rescue (SAR) burden on merchant
shipping.1 As human smugglers pack economic migrants and refugees by
the hundreds onto unseaworthy vessels lacking the capacity to safely
complete the treacherous sea crossings from North Africa and the Middle
East to European shores, courageous commercial shipmasters and crews
have regularly served as first responders to requests for assistance.2 While
these acts of heroism have been lauded as compliant with entrenched moral
and legal obligations, it is often overlooked that they have also come at great
expense to shipping industry participants.3
During the most taxing stretches from 2014 to the present, commercial
vessels have been summoned to aid distressed migrants on a near daily
basis.4 These rescues have often required perilous embarkation of hundreds
1
See Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, INT’L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, http://www.ics-ship
ping.org/key-issues/all-key-issues-(full-list)/mediterranean-migrant-crisis (last visited Nov. 22,
2017) [hereinafter Mediterranean Migrant Crisis]. Two thousand sixteen was the deadliest
period of migrant drownings on record. This trend of widespread fatalities continued in 2017.
See 2016 Deadliest Year Ever for Migrants Crossing Mediterranean – UN Agency, U.N. NEWS
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/01/548962-2016-deadliest-year-ever-migrantscrossing-mediterranean-un-agency; Mediterranean Update, Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals
and Fatalities Infographic, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.iom.int/inf
ographics/mediterranean-update-migration-flows-europe-arrivals-and-fatalities-21-december-20
16; Mediterranean Update, Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and Fatalities Infographic, INT’L
ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Nov. 14, 2017), https://relief web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resour
ces/171114_Mediterranean_Update.pdf [hereinafter IOM, Mediterranean Update].
2
Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, supra note 1.
3
Emma Diltz, Death and Desperation Taint Mediterranean Shipping Routes, POLITICO (May
25, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/refugees-europe-migration-death-and-desperation-onmediterranean-shipping-routes/; Sara Sjolin, Shipping Industry Braces for Costs from Migrant
Crisis, MARKET WATCH (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/shipp ing-industrybraces-for-costs-from-migrant-crisis-2015-09-09; Jonathan Saul, In Mediterranean, Commercial
Ships Scoop Up Desperate Human Cargo, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/europe-migr ants-ship/; Terry Donaghy, Migrant Crisis
Prompts Trade and Insurance Questions, LLOYD’S LIST (Aug. 30, 2015), https://lloydslist.mariti
meintelligence.informa.com/LL018178/Migrant-crisis-prompts-trade-and-insurance-questions;
Max Tingyao Lin, Latest Tragedy Shows Why Merchant Shipping Should Not Be Main Rescuer
for Mediterranean Migrants, LLOYD’S LIST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligen
ce.informa.com/LL016431/Latest-tragedy-shows-why-merchant-shipping-should-not-be-main-r
escuer-for-Mediterranean-migrants; James Politi & Joel Lewin, Shipping Companies Warn of
Migrant Rescue Risks, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/d8d0f67a-9bfe11e4-b6cc-00144feabdc0.
4
Mediterranean Migrants Crisis: Shipping Cannot Cope Alone, LLOYD’S LIST (Mar. 4,
2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL016701/Mediterranean-migrant scrisis-shipping-cannot-cope-alone; Craig Eason, Migrants in the Med: Shipping Will Continue to
Respond, but it Cannot Solve the Problem, LLOYD’S LIST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://lloydslist.mar
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of people at a time, followed by navigational diversions and complex
coordination with coastal authorities to determine an appropriate place of
disembarkation.5 The direct and indirect costs arising out of these operations
can be staggering. Shipping interests have routinely reported losses running
into the tens and even hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars.6 In response,
industry stakeholders have repeatedly urged coastal states and supranational
organizations to more effectively lead SAR functions, yet dependence on
commercial resources persists.7
International law is unequivocal that commercial shipmasters are obliged
to render assistance to distressed vessels without any promise of
compensation.8 Unfortunately, the language of popularly used shipping

itimeintelligence.informa.com/LL018103/Migrants-in-the-Med-shipping-will-continue-to-respo
nd-but-it-cannot-solve-the-problem.
5
Mediterranean Migrants Crisis: Shipping Cannot Cope Alone, supra note 4; Eason,
supra note 4. As the mass arrival of migrants in Europe sparks political backlash, industry
stakeholders have voiced concern that coastal states may change their policies and become
less willing to allow disembarkation from merchant ships. See Jane Mcintosh, Italy Threatens
to Turn Away Foreign Ships with Rescued Migrants, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 28, 2017),
http://www.dw.com/en/italy-threatens-to-turn-away-foreign-ships-with-rescued-migrants/a-3
9462522.
6
See Liam Moloney & Costas Paris, Europe’s Cargo Ships Diverted to Sea Rescues, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boat-people-trying-to-reach-europe-disruptmediterranean-mercantile-shipping-1427399702; Saul, supra note 3.
7
ICS Calls on UN to Act on Migrant Deaths, LLOYD’S LIST (Feb. 17, 2017), https://lloyds
list.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL025618/ICS-calls-on-UN-to-act-on-migrant-deaths;
Janet Porter, German Shipowners Call for Massive Expansion of Mediterranean Rescue Efforts,
LLOYD’S LIST (Apr. 22, 2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL016401/G
erman-shipowners-call-for-massive-expansion-of-Mediterranean-rescue-efforts; Craig Eason,
Shipping Bodies Urge the International Community to Stop Boat Migrants, LLOYD’S LIST (Dec.
18, 2014), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL048926/Shipping-bodies-urge-t
he-international-community-to-stop-boat-migrants. Unsurprisingly, since commercial crews are
generally untrained for large-scale humanitarian operations and are often substantially
outnumbered by persons in need of assistance, there have been reports of psychological injuries
arising out of these migrant rescues. Some crews have reported shocking abuses by migrant
smugglers, such as the dumping of women and children into the sea to lure passing ships to stop
for assistance. Others have reported having to barricade themselves inside their own vessel after
embarking over 1,000 people. See Fanny Carrier, ‘We Locked Ourselves In’ – A Captain’s
Migrant Log, MODERN GHANA (May 31, 2017), https://www.modernghana.com/news/778773/w
e-locked-ourselves-in-a-captains-migrant-log.html; Lizzie Dearden, Migrant Boat Crisis: Human
Smugglers ‘Throwing Pregnant Women and Children Overboard to Drown to Force
Commercial Ships to Rescue Them,’ INDEPENDENT (June 1, 2015), http://www.independent.co.u
k/news/world/europe/migrant-boat-crisis-human-smugglers-throwing-pregnant-women-andchildren-overboard-to-drown-to-force-10290183.html; Craig Eason, Mediterranean Trafficking
Gangs Dump Boat People Near Passing Ships, LLOYD’S LIST (Sept. 26, 2014), https://lloydslist.
maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL047761/Mediterranean-trafficking-gangs-dump-boat-peop
le-near-passing-ships.
8
See infra Section II.
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contracts allocating who among the relevant shipping interests must absorb
rescue costs is far less clear.9 For instance, the decades-old but ever-popular
New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) 1946 time charterparty form produced
by the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO) remains in
widespread commercial use in the dry-cargo trade,10 yet it is silent on
relevant rescue-related liabilities.11
This Article focuses on this contractual uncertainty of humanitarian
rescue costs. First, it outlines the legal obligations imposed on private
shipmasters to render assistance to distressed vessels and discusses the
related commercial consequences.12 Next, it examines the language of
popularly used shipping contracts and evaluates deficiencies regarding
rescue cost allocation, including an in-depth analysis of relevant court
opinions and arbitration awards from both the United States and England.13
Finally, drawing from the shipping industry’s experience in modifying
contracts in response to pressing challenges, such as maritime piracy, it
argues that new contract clauses should be developed and adopted to more
precisely address rescue risk.14
Note that for purposes of continuity in exploring contract language, this
Article focuses on the language of NYPE time charterparty forms, in
particular the NYPE 1946 form.15 The continued commercial importance of
the NYPE 1946 form and the jurisprudence it has produced make discussion
of its terms practically significant and may also expose problems arising
under other widely used forms.16 For the sake of brevity and clarity, related
issues connected to voyage charterparties, bills of lading, and other contracts
of carriage are largely neglected.17
9

See infra Sections II–III.
See Paul Todd, NYPE 2015: Wholesale Reform or an Invitation to Cherry-Pick?,
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 306, 306 (2016), https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/389633/2/Todd%252
0NYPE%25202015%2520LMCLQ.pdf (discussing industry reluctance to adopt updated
iterations of the NYPE forms designed to reflect modern commercial practices).
11
See infra Section III.
12
See infra Section II.
13
See infra Sections III.
14
See infra Sections IV–V.
15
See TERENCE COGHLIN ET AL., TIME CHARTERS 774–77 (7th ed. 2014), for a copy of the
New York Produce Exchange Form 1946.
16
See id. at 1 (describing the NYPE 1946 form as “the most important standard form for
dry cargo charters”); see also BIMCO, ASBA & SMF, NYPE 2015 Time Charter Party
Explanatory Notes, SMF 1, 3, http://www.smf.com.sg/pdf/NYPE%202015%20Explanatory%
20Notes.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (“The 1946 edition is arguably still the most
commonly used version of the NYPE charter. . . .”).
17
For an overview of related issues arising out of migrant rescues, see Kathleen S.
Goddard, Rescuing Refugees and Migrants at Sea: Some Commercial Shipping Implications,
21 INT’L J. MAR. L. 352 (2015).
10
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II. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO RESCUE AND ITS IMPACT ON MERCHANT
SHIPPING DURING PERIODS OF MASS MIGRATION AT SEA
To fully appreciate the impact of maritime migration on the shipping
industry, it is first important to examine the scope of the search and rescue
obligations imposed on private shipmasters. This section explores the
principles arising under international law obliging shipmasters to render
assistance to distressed vessels and coordinate with sovereign authorities to
ensure rescued persons are delivered to a place of safety. It then evaluates
possible financial losses flowing from compliance with these obligations,
setting the stage for examining allocation of rescue costs.
A. The Scope of the Shipmaster Obligation to Rescue at Sea
The long-standing practice of seafarers assisting one another in distress
situations is a maritime tradition with deeply-rooted humanitarian
underpinnings.18 Over the centuries, through widespread recognition, this
practice formed customary international law obliging shipmasters, including
those operating vessels for commercial purposes, to altruistically perform
rescues at sea without the expectation of compensation in return.19
During the twentieth century, this customary norm was codified through
international agreements, which today articulate the scope of this duty in
more precise terms. Following the tragic sinking of the Titanic, in which
more than 1,500 civilian passengers perished, the international community
responded by promulgating the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS
Convention), which expressly recognizes the duty to rescue at sea.20 The
SOLAS Convention has since been revised and amended, with the current
iteration containing the following language: “[t]he master of a ship at sea
which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving
information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to
proceed with all speed to their assistance. . . .”21 This shipmaster duty is
18

See generally Steven F. Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at Sea, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1218 (1979).
19
Customary international law derives from “a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
20
See Jeffrey Maltzman & Mona Ehrenreich, The Seafarer’s Ancient Duty to Rescue and
Modern Attempts to Regulate and Criminalize the Good Samaritan, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1267,
1268–69, 1274 (2015) (discussing public outcry over the SS California’s alleged refusal to
render assistance to the capsized Titanic); see also Friedell, supra note 18.
21
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. V, reg. 33.1 Nov. 1, 1974, 32
U.S.T. 47 [hereinafter SOLAS Convention].
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similarly defined by international instruments governing marine salvage,
including both the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with
Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea (Brussels Convention) and the
more recent International Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention).22
The applicable language of the Salvage Convention reads, “[e]very master is
bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and
persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at
sea.”23
Private shipmasters, of course, do not bear the sole responsibility to
facilitate maritime search and rescue. The international legal framework
instead imposes primary rescue responsibility on state actors. The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), requires Contracting
States on the coasts to, “promote the establishment, operation and
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service
regarding safety on and over the sea. . . .”24 The International Convention on
Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) further obliges coastal states
to establish Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) to monitor distress signals
and direct rescue responses with ships operating in nearby waters.25 The
SAR Convention also identifies the broad scope of this obligation by
requiring that rescuers deliver rescued persons to a “place of safety.”26 In
fulfilling this duty, the SAR Convention contemplates a cooperative effort
between RCCs and private vessels.27 In fact, the accompanying Guidelines
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea issued in 2004 under the
auspices of the International Maritime Organization acknowledge that it may
be the assisting private ship that actually transports survivors to the place of
safety under the direction of the RCC.28
22

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage
at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. Article 11 of the
Brussels Convention reads, “Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious
danger to his vessel, her crew and her passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even
though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.”
23
International Convention on Salvage art. 10.1, Apr. 28, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S. 165
[hereinafter Salvage Convention].
24
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
25
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue ¶¶ 2.3.1–2.3.3, Apr. 27, 1979,
1403 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter SAR Convention]; Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons
Rescued at Sea ¶ 6.7, May 20, 2004, MSC 78/26/Add.2.
26
Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue, 1979, as amended, Res. MSC 155(78) (May 20, 2004).
27
Id.
28
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, supra note 25, ¶ 6.18 (“Often the
assisting ship or another ship may be able to transport the survivors to a place of safety.
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This interplay between the state responsibility to oversee SAR functions
and the private obligation to assist is further established through treaty
provisions addressing shipmaster compliance. Under UNCLOS, Contracting
States are obliged to enforce private shipmaster obligations by “requiring”
the master of ships flying their flag “to render assistance to any person found
at sea in danger of being lost” and “to proceed with all possible speed to the
rescue of person in distress, if informed of their need for assistance.”29 The
Salvage Convention employs similar language mandating that State Parties
“adopt measures necessary to enforce” the shipmaster’s duty to render
assistance.30 Domestic legislatures have generally followed suit, producing
statutes providing for civil and criminal penalties against shipmasters failing
to respond to requests for assistance.31
Notably absent from this legal framework is any exception for
shipmasters operating vessels for commercial purposes.32 These obligations
are therefore presumed to apply to shipmasters operating private vessels of
all types, including bulk carriers, container vessels, tankers, fishing vessels,
and cruise liners alike. Despite the glaring differences between the physical
characteristics of these vessels and their feasibility for use in rescue
operations, the legal obligations placed on the shipmasters operating them at
sea is fundamentally the same.

However, if performing this function would be a hardship for the ship, RCCs should attempt
to arrange use of other reasonable alternatives.”).
29
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 98(1).
30
Salvage Convention, supra note 23, art. 10.
31
For example, in the United States, 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (2018) provides:
(a) (1) A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render assistance to
any individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the master or
individual in charge can do so without serious danger to the master’s or
individual’s vessel or individuals on board.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a vessel of war or a vessel
owned by the United States Government appropriated only to a
public service.
(b) A master or individual violating this section shall be fined not more than
$ 1,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
England, Italy, Greece, Malta, and others have adopted similar legislation. See, e.g., The
Merchant Shipping (Distress Messages) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1691, ¶ 7 (Eng.); Italian
Code of Navigation 1958, art. 1158; Greek Code of Public Maritime Law art. 227, October 3,
1973, No. 261; Malta Merchant Shipping Act ch. 234, ¶¶ 305–306.
32
Nevertheless, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, supra note 25,
¶ 6.3 reads, “A ship should not be subject to undue delay, financial burden or other related
difficulties after assisting persons at sea; therefore coastal States should relieve the ship as
soon as practicable.”
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B. The Costs of Commercial Vessel Contributions to Large-Scale Rescues
Using commercial vessels for large-scale rescues is both dangerous and
remarkably costly.33 Some of the direct costs include humanitarian
provisions, additional wages and stores, extra fuel consumed during and after
the rescue, port charges assessed during disembarkation of rescued persons,
and repairing, restocking, and cleaning the vessel itself. The indirect costs
are likely to be even more substantial. If the vessel deviates from its
intended voyage, embarks rescued persons, and then proceeds to actually
transport the rescued persons to a safe port, this is likely to generate
substantial loss of time and prevent the vessel from fulfilling its scheduled
commercial activities. Such delays may impact a variety of actors with an
economic stake in the underlying voyage, including shipowners, charterers,
cargo interests, and insurers. Anecdotally, stakeholders have recently
reported losses of up to USD $500,000 arising out of a single migrant vessel
rescue causing the vessel to be delayed for one week.34
Under the law of salvage, it is possible for a rescuer to recover a reward
for protecting the property interests of a third party shipowner. For several
reasons, however, this salvage framework is unlikely to provide any recourse
for losses suffered while providing assistance to a migrant vessel. While the
Salvage Convention acknowledges life saving to be one factor in
determining salvage remuneration, life salvage has traditionally been treated
differently than property salvage.35 In jurisdictions like the United States,
life salvage is only recoverable from the shipowner if it is made
contemporaneously with property salvage.36 Pure life salvage, in contrast,
will not give rise to an independent claim of recovery against the shipowner
33
For a more thorough examination the dangers associated with using commercial vessels
for large-scale rescues, see Richard L. Kilpatrick, Jr. & Adam Smith, The International Legal
Obligation to Rescue During Mass Migration at Sea: Navigating the Sovereign and
Commercial Dimensions of a Mediterranean Crisis, 28 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 141, 142–94 (2015).
See also International Maritime Organization, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees &
International Chamber of Shipping, Rescue at Sea: A Guide to Principles and Practice As
Applied to Refugee and Migrants, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/brochure
s/450037d34/rescue-sea-guide-principles-practice-applied-migrants-refugees.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2018).
34
See Liam Moloney & Costas Paris, Europe’s Cargo Ships Diverted to Sea Rescues,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boat-people-trying-to-reach-europ
e-disrupt-mediterranean-mercantile-shipping-1427399702 (noting the extra costs resulting
from rescues could cause “serious financial problems” for some smaller shipping companies).
35
Salvage Convention, supra note 23, art. 13(1)(e) (“[T]he skill and efforts of the salvors in
salving the vessel, other property and life.” (emphasis added)). See generally FRANCIS ROSE,
KENNEDY AND ROSE ON THE LAW OF SALVAGE 124–45 (9th ed. 2017).
36
See Martin Davies, Whatever Happened to the Salvage Convention 1989?, 39 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 463, 498–99 (2008).
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or rescued persons.37 This doctrine effectively denying compensation for
saving life, but allowing it for saving property, has long been controversial.38
While Article 16(1) of the Salvage Convention explicitly provides that
payment will not be owed from rescued persons, it also appears to allow
national law to derogate from this principle.39 Nevertheless, even in
jurisdictions in which pure life salvage creates an independent claim, this
would not be helpful to the life salvor if the rescued persons are
impoverished seafarers packed onto worthless inflatable rafts “owned” by
elusive migrant smuggling cartels.
An alternative for the rescuer would be to seek reimbursement from a
fund administered by some external entity, such as a sovereign fund designed
to cover the costs of saving lives. Unfortunately, no such fund currently
exists at the international level.40 Although some statutes like the English
Merchant Shipping Act of 1995 appear to legislate such options at the
domestic level, these rely on narrow qualifying circumstances subject to
political discretion.41 Their efficacy in adequately compensating rescuers is
also largely untested (and in the context of expensive large-scale rescues,
unlikely).42
The unfortunate reality is that the costs of rescues are likely to be
absorbed by the parties with a pecuniary interest in the underlying
commercial voyage. These actors may hedge against some of these risks
through special insurance products, but standard cargo and hull insurance
policies are not designed to cover such losses. Even protection and
indemnity (P&I) coverage intended to guard against more open-ended
liabilities would cover only a portion of rescue costs.43
37
38

Id.
See Freidell, supra note 18 (discussing the history of life salvage under Anglo-American

law).
39
See Salvage Convention, supra note 23, art. 16(1); see also ROSE, supra note 35, at 141
(noting it is unclear whether national laws could override the general immunity of
remuneration from saved persons under Article 16).
40
Some industry participants have argued that accepting payment for large-scale rescues is
dangerous because it implies that merchant shipping might be able to serve as a permanent
solution to large-scale search and rescue. See David Osler, Shipping Should Reject Migrant
Compensation, Grimaldi Urges, LLOYD’S LIST (Oct. 16, 2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintellig
ence.informa.com/LL020890/Shipping-should-reject-migrant-compensation-Grimaldi-urges.
41
The U.K. Merchant Shipping Act 1995 § 224 (1), sch. 11, part II, ¶ 5 grants the Secretary
of State the discretion to award compensation to a pure life salvor when the rescue involves a
U.K. registered vessel or occurs in U.K. waters.
42
See ROSE, supra note 35, at 144–45 n.400 (noting the discretionary payments for pure
life salvage available under U.K. law have been “exercised rarely” and involved “modest
sums” of no more than 250£).
43
P&I clubs are mutual self-insurance associations providing broad terms of liability
coverage. See generally Norman J. Ronneberg, Jr., An Introduction to the Protection &
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In fact, in the wake of the recent surge in large-scale rescues occurring in
the Mediterranean Sea, members of the International Group of P&I clubs
have clarified the scope of their coverage through circulars, newsletters, and
press releases. These publications have explained that P&I club rules may
allow recovery of some of the direct rescue-related losses, such as fuel,
stores, provisions, and port charges, but the indirect losses linked to delays
will not be covered.44 Consequently, P&I clubs have advised members to
ensure their commercial contracts reflect the parties’ intentions on rescue
risk allocation. In a 2015 loss prevention guidance, the Standard Club
advised, “it is important that [P&I club] members give careful thought to
making express and clear provisions within their commercial contracts as to
who—principally, owner or charterer—will be liable” for the time lost
during migrant vessel rescues.45 Similarly, the Swedish Club, in a recent
guidance published on its website, emphasized, “the wording of the
[charterparty] will decide where the costs for the diversion, as well as other
costs, will fall.”46 It also urged club members to recognize the substantial
losses that could be involved in migrant rescues and recommended contracts
include language, “to minimize the exposure and avoid uncertainty through
clear wording.”47
III. UNCERTAINTY REGARDING WHO BEARS THE RISK OF RESCUE-RELATED
COSTS
Determining which commercial actors are responsible for such rescue
costs can involve untangling complex contractual terms reflected in
charterparties, bills of lading, policies of insurance, and other documents of
commercial and legal significance. Risk allocations defined under the
governing charterparties are particularly important and serve as the focus of
this section.

Indemnity Clubs and the Marine Insurance They Provide, 3 U.S.F MAR. L.J. 1 (1990); W.L.
Rivers Black III, A P&I Club’s Expectations, and an Admiralty Lawyer’s Approach for
Responding to Marine Casualty Investigations, 24 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 225 (2011).
44
See Refugees at Sea, THE UK P&I CLUB (Apr. 2005), https://www.ukpandi.com/knowledg
e-publications/industry-issues/industry-developments/refugees-at-sea/; Refugees and Migrants
Rescued at Sea: Loss Prevention Circular No. 13-09, GARD (Sept. 2009), http://www.gard.no/
Content/135829/No%2013-09%20Refugees%20and%20migrants%20rescued%20at%20sea.pdf
AS.
45
Refugees/ Migrants at Sea, THE STANDARD CLUB (July 2005), http://www.standard-club.
com/media/2533684/people-claims-refugees-migrants-at-sea.pdf.
46
Refugees in the Mediterranean, The Swedish Club, https://www.swedishclub.com/loss-pr
evention/trading-area/refugees-in-the-mediterranean/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
47
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Charterparties define the rights, obligations, and liabilities between the
shipowner and the charterer who, depending on its commercial needs,
generally contracts either to employ the shipowner’s vessel for a fixed period
of time or for a particular voyage.48 In the dry trade, the time charterparty is
the most common type of agreement, in which the shipowner and charterer
agree to a fixed period for the shipowner and its crew to continue operating
the vessel while the charterer gives the shipowner orders to fulfill
commercial responsibilities that the charterer has arranged.49 In exchange
for the use of the shipowner’s vessel, shipmaster and crew, the charterer is
obliged to compensate the shipowner through periodic payments of an
agreed flat-rate fee called “hire” and must cover other expenses such as
fuel.50 Through this arrangement both the shipowner and the charterer can
turn a profit as the shipowner and its agents facilitate the vessel’s
maintenance and navigation while the charterer dictates the vessel’s
commercial activities.51 Shipowners and charterers are generally free to
negotiate the specific terms of their agreement under freedom of contract
principles, yet uniformity in the industry is maintained through the
widespread use of standard contract forms, such as the NYPE 1946.52
If the time-chartered vessel deviates from its intended course or is
otherwise delayed, this lost time may raise legal questions regarding who
must absorb the financial consequences. If the delay arises out of a
shipmaster’s decision to provide assistance to a distressed third-party vessel,
at least two critical commercial issues arise: first, if the rescue involves a
deviation from the vessel’s intended course, does this amount to a
shipowner’s breach of the charterparty? Second, even if such a deviation
does not breach the charterparty, must the charterer continue to pay hire and
other expenses during the period that the vessel is not being used for its
intended commercial purposes? Each of these questions are explored below.
A. Is Deviation to Rescue Third Parties a Breach of Contract?
Under a time charterparty, the charterer has the right and responsibility to
order employment of the vessel.53 To fulfill the shipowner’s obligations, the
shipmaster must comply with the charterer’s orders and “prosecute his

48

See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1–12.
Id.
50
Id. at 4.
51
Id. at 10.
52
See HOWARD BENNETT ET AL., CARVER ON CHARTERPARTIES 1–2 (2017) (discussing
uniformity in charterparties achieved through the use of standard forms and clauses).
53
See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 9, 335.
49
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voyage with utmost dispatch.”54 If the shipmaster employs the vessel for
purposes that are not authorized or otherwise justified, then the charterer may
have grounds to argue those actions breach the charterparty.55 If the
shipmaster delays prosecution of the voyage in order to render assistance to a
distressed vessel, a relevant legal question is whether such a deviation is
authorized by law or express language in the charterparty.
In practice, when giving employment orders, a time charterer might not
give specific instructions regarding the vessel’s route since navigation is
within the responsibilities of the shipowner (an agreement on the details of
the voyage route is perhaps more likely in the context of a voyage charter or
a trip time charter).56 In the time charter context, it is generally understood
that the shipmaster maintains a degree of autonomy and freedom to diverge
from the intended course so long as the reasons for the deviation are
justified, such as to protect the safety of the vessel, crew, and cargo, or
otherwise fall within the professional expertise of the shipmasters.57
While there are few published cases directly addressing the question of
whether deviation for purposes of rendering assistance to a distressed thirdparty vessel is justified, the early English case Scaramanga v. Stamp
discussed this issue in striking terms.58 In that case, the dispute arose during
a chartered voyage of the Olympias carrying a load of wheat from Cronstadt
(an island off the coast of today’s St. Petersburg, Russia) to the
Mediterranean Sea.59 As the Olympias sailed along the North Sea, she
encountered a vessel called the Arion whose machinery had broken down.60
The Olympias could have rescued the crew and left the Arion adrift at sea,
but the shipmaster of the Arion instead negotiated an agreement with the
shipmaster of the Olympias to tow the disabled Arion to the Netherlands in
exchange for a salvage payment.61 While en route to the Netherlands with
the Arion in tow, the Olympias ran aground, and its cargo was lost.62

54

Id. at 327. See also id. at 775, ¶ 8.
See id. at 327.
56
See id. at 331 (discussing the issue of deviation in the context of a time charter, but
noting that the concept of deviation has developed primarily in relation to bills of lading and
voyage charters); see also YVONNE BAATZ, MARITIME LAW 149–50 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing
the applicability of the doctrine of deviation when a time charterer gives express instructions
on the route); MARTIN DAVIES & ANTHONY DICKEY, SHIPPING LAW 533–36 (4th ed. 2016)
(discussing what kinds of orders a time charterer may give to the shipmaster).
57
DAVIES & DICKEY, supra note 56, at 533–35.
58
Scaramanga v. Stamp [1879] 4 CPD 316, aff’d, [1880] 5 CPD 295.
59
Scaramanga v. Stamp [1880] 5 CPD 295 at 295.
60
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Although the charterparty contained a provision exculpating the
shipowner from liability for damage to the cargo caused by “perils of the
seas,” the charterer submitted that the cargo was lost during the property
salvage attempt, which it argued was a “wrongful deviation.”63 Determining
who bore the risk of cargo loss hinged on whether the deviation of the
Olympias was justified.64 If the deviation was justified, then the charterer
would bear the loss because it had agreed not to hold the shipowner liable for
cargo loss caused by the traditional perils of the seas. However, if the
deviation was unjustified and the cargo was lost during that part of the
voyage then the shipowner would have been in breach of contract at the time
of the loss and would therefore be responsible.65
In making this determination, the English court cogently explained the
special common law liberty of shipowners to deviate for the purpose of
saving lives, irrespective of the negative impact on other commercial actors
with an interest in the underlying shipment.66 The court wrote:
The impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one of
the most beneficial instincts of humanity, and is nowhere more
salutary in its results than in bringing help to those who,
exposed to destruction from the fury of winds and waves,
would perish if left without assistance. To all who have to trust
themselves to the sea, it is of the utmost importance that the
promptings of humanity in this respect should not be checked
or interfered with by prudential considerations as to injurious
consequences, which may result to a ship or cargo from the
rendering of the needed aid. It would be against the common
good, and shocking to the sentiments of mankind, that the
shipowner should be deterred from endeavoring to save life by
the fear, lest any disaster to ship or cargo, consequent on so
doing, should fall on himself. Yet it would be unjust to expect
that he should be called upon to satisfy the call of humanity at
his own entire risk.
Moreover, the uniform practice of the mariners of every
nation—except such as are in the habit of making the
unfortunate their prey—of succouring others who are in
danger, is so universal and well known, that there is neither
63
64
65
66

Id. at 298.
Id.
Id. at 298–99.
Id. at 304.
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injustice nor hardship in treating both the merchant and the
insurer as making their contracts with the shipowner as subject
to this exception to the general rule of not deviating from the
appointed course. Goods owners and insurers must be taken, at
all events in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as
acquiescing in the universal practice of the maritime world,
prompted as it is by the inherent instinct of human nature, and
founded on the common interest of all who are exposed to the
perils of the seas.67
Articulating this ancient principle of risk-sharing between shipping
interests when fellow seafarers in distress face imminent loss of life, the
court identified an implied liberty for the shipmaster as an agent of the
shipowner to deviate from the agreed course. 68
The court framed this common law rule in contrast to deviation to save
property, noting “[d]eviation for the purpose of saving property stands
obviously on a totally different footing” and therefore “entails the usual
consequences of deviation.”69 Applying the rule to the facts before it, the
court found that while the Olympias had justifiably deviated to render
assistance to the Arion’s crew, the additional deviation of towing the Arion to
obtain salvage was unreasonable, and therefore the shipowner (not the
charterer or its insurer) bore the risk of cargo loss.70
In addition to this common law rule shielding the shipowner from liability
arising out of deviation to save life, widely used charterparty forms also
‘certain circumstances. These clauses typically contain the liberty to assist
other vessels. For example, Clause 16 of the NYPE 1946 form reads in
relevant part, “[t]he vessel shall have the liberty to sail with or without pilots,
to tow and to be towed, to assist vessels in distress, and to deviate for the
purpose of saving life and property.”71
67

Id. at 304–05.
Id.
69
Id. The court wrote:
Deviation for the purpose of saving life is protected, and involves neither
forfeiture of insurance nor liability to the goods owner in respect of loss
which would otherwise be within the exceptions of “perils of the seas.” And,
as a necessary consequence of the foregoing, deviation for the purpose of
communicating with a ship in distress is allowable, inasmuch as the state of
the vessel in distress may involve danger to life. On the other hand, deviation
for the sole purpose of saving property is not thus privileged, but entails all
the usual consequences of deviation.
Id. at 304.
70
Id. at 306.
71
See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 776, cl. 16.
68
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Widely recognized international conventions also address the issue of
deviation as it relates to the rights and liabilities allocated between carriers
and shippers under a bill of lading. For instance, the International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading (Hague Rules) expressly exculpates the carrier for liability arising out
of life-saving deviations.72 Article IV (4) of the Hague Rules reads:
Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at
sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an
infringement or breach of this Convention or of the contract of
carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or
damage resulting therefrom.73
Note that the more recent Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, and
Rotterdam Rules also each contain similar provisions exculpating the carrier
for losses caused by efforts to save lives at sea.74
These international agreements were designed to apply to bills of lading
governing the relationship between carriers and shippers, but they still carry
relevance in charterparty disputes because charterparty forms regularly
incorporate these rules (or the domestic equivalents) through a “Clause
Paramount.” For example, Clause 24 of the NYPE 1946 form reads, “[t]he
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States . . . shall be deemed to be
incorporated herein. . . .”75 Note that the referenced Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA) is recognized as reflecting the Hague Rules through
nearly verbatim language.76
The effect of incorporating the Hague Rules or domestic legislation like
COGSA into the charterparty is that the rights and liabilities of the shipper
and carrier described in the rules apply to the charterparty by reading the
shipowner as the “carrier” and the charterer as the “shipper.”77 Thus, even if
the charterparty does not include an express provision granting the liberty to
72

International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading (Hague Rules) art. 4, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 LNTS 187, 51 Stat. 533.
73
Id. Note that the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading 1968 (Hague-Visby Rules) art. 4(4), Feb. 23,
1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 127, contains nearly verbatim language.
74
See United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) art.
5(6), Mar. 31, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 89/5, 17 I.L.M. 806; see also United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly By Sea
(The Rotterdam Rules) art. 17(3)(l), Dec. 11, 2008, A/RES63/112.
75
See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, cl. 24.
76
See Senator Linie GMBH & Co. KG v. Sunway Line, Inc., 291 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir.
2002) (discussing the desire of COGSA legislators to maintain the language of the Hague Rules).
77
See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 52, at 396.
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deviate for life saving purposes, by way of a Clause Paramount a shipowner
may still be able to rely on the liberty to deviate for life-saving rescues.
Taken as a whole, these common law, contractual, and convention-based
principles place the shipowner on solid legal footing in situations in which
the shipmaster has delayed or deviated from the intended voyage to render
assistance to a third-party distressed vessel. Applying these principles, it is
highly unlikely that a charterer could successfully argue the shipowner has
breached the charterparty by deviating to save life. However, since
charterparties are freely negotiated, there is nothing preventing a charterer
from negotiating charterparty clauses that favorably allocate the financial
consequences of life-saving deviations as the responsibility of the
shipowner.78
B. Is a Time Chartered Vessel On or Off-Hire During Rescue-Related
Delays?
While the shipowner is unlikely to be found in breach of the charterparty
when the shipmaster deviates to render assistance to other vessels, it is a
separate question whether the charterer owes the shipowner hire during such
a deviation. The default arrangement under a time charterparty is that the
charterer is obliged to pay hire continuously to the shipowner throughout the
charter period.79 The charterer’s obligation will be suspended only when
certain contractually stipulated events place the vessel “off-hire.”
The off-hire provision contained in Clause 15 of the NYPE 1946 form
reads in relevant part as follows:
That in the event of the loss of time from deficiency of men or
stores, fire, breakdown or damage to hull, machinery or
equipment, grounding, detention by average accidents to ship
or cargo, drydocking for purpose of examination or painting
bottom, or by any other cause preventing the full working of
the vessel, the payment of hire shall cease for the time thereby
lost. . . .80
This clause contemplates enumerated causes “preventing the full working
of the vessel” in which “payment of hire shall cease” during the lost time.
These enumerated causes are quite specific, but may broadly be classified as

78
79
80

See infra Section IV.
See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 441.
Id. at 776, cl. 15.
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either problems with the vessel itself or arising out of the shipowner’s
responsibility as the vessel operator.
The clause also contains a so-called “sweep up” provision recognizing
“any other cause” to be an off-hire event so long as it “prevents the full
working of the vessel.”81 The sweep-up provision is typically interpreted
within the context of the charter as a whole through a principle known as the
ejusdem generis rule.82 This rule presumes the contract drafters included
“any other cause” at the end of the list only to capture other similar causes to
those specifically enumerated in the clause, rather than to serve as an openended catchall provision.83
Complicating matters, conventional NYPE forms are often amended to
add the word “whatsoever” to the sweep-up provision, which places the
vessel off-hire “by any other cause whatsoever preventing the full working of
the vessel.”84 The amended language precludes the application of the
ejusdem generis rule and instead suggests any event could trigger the off-hire
clause if it prevents the vessel from “full working.”85
Whether loss of time caused by providing assistance to a third-party
distressed vessel falls within this category of off-hire events remains a
question of fact and contract construction. In making such determinations,
the critical issues would be whether the event actually prevents the full
working of the vessel and, if so, whether the cause is specifically enumerated
or otherwise captured under the sweep-up provision.
1. Cases Addressing the Question of Hire During Rescue-Related Delays
NYPE forms (along with other widely used charterparty forms)
customarily include an arbitration clause. Consequently, controversies
arising under NYPE terms are normally resolved outside of national court
systems. This makes published case law analyzing off-hire clauses scarce
and difficult to track since many industry players prefer to use arbitration to
ensure confidentiality. Nevertheless, some relevant arbitration awards have
been published and others have been reviewed through domestic courts in
published judgments, which sheds some much- needed light on how off-hire
clauses might be interpreted in disputes over rescue-related delays.

81

Id.
See id. at 450.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. Professor Davies has questioned whether this amendment makes any difference at all.
See Martin Davies, The Off-Hire Clause in the New York Produce Exchange Time
Charterparty, 1 LLOYD’S MAR. COM. L.Q. 107 (1990).
82
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The most well-known example is Ca Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank
Line (Roachbank).86 In that case, the legal issue was whether a time
chartered vessel was off-hire during a delay flowing from a deviation to
conduct a large-scale rescue.87 In 1979, while en route from Singapore to
Taiwan via the South China Sea as part of a larger voyage towards South
America, the M/V Roachbank encountered a vessel with 293 stranded
The shipmaster of the Roachbank ordered
Vietnamese migrants.88
embarkation of the migrants at sea and then proceeded towards the ship’s
intended destination at Kaosiung, Taiwan.89 After the vessel arrived off of
the port, the Taiwanese authorities refused to allow the Roachbank to enter
the harbor until the shipowner agreed to disallow the migrants from
disembarking and was able to secure a bank guarantee to cover any financial
losses arising from a breach of that agreement.90
The migrant rescue and the subsequent reaction of the Taiwanese
authorities caused the Roachbank to be delayed for nearly nine days.91 This
delay spawned a legal dispute between the shipowner and the charterer
regarding whether hire was owed during that period.92 The voyage at issue
was fixed under the slightly amended NYPE 1946 form containing an offhire clause referencing “any other cause whatsoever preventing the full
working of the vessel” as an off-hire event.93
The dispute was referred to arbitration, and the majority of the arbitrators
found that the vessel remained on hire during the rescue and subsequent
delays.94 The arbitrators’ award itself was not published, but pursuant to
English procedure, the charterers were given leave to appeal in the English
Commercial Court.95 On review, the court cited passages from the award
explaining why the Roachbank remained on hire during the delay even
though the vessel was prevented from entering port due to the “attitude” of
the Taiwanese authorities, as well as the stevedores on shore who refused to
perform cargo work with the migrants still on board.96

86
C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 498,
aff’d [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 337 (Eng. C.A.).
87
Id. at 499.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 500.
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Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
95
Id.
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Id. at 501.
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The court recounted the arbitrator majority’s reasoning, noting the
following findings: while there was a possibility of modest delays while
migrants were “herded to non-working areas” of the vessel, the “hindrance of
the number of persons on board” did not “impair ‘the full working of the
vessel’ as a physical reality.”97 Instead, the Roachbank was “always capable
as a vessel of performing the service immediately required by the charterers
and was not prevented by the presence of the refugees from being fully
worked, had port facilities been made available for them to do so.”98
The court further addressed the arbitrator majority’s discussion of
whether the presence of migrants on board the vessel and the unwillingness
of the Taiwanese authorities to allow access to the port qualified as a “cause”
The court also cited
under the amended sweep-up provision.99
counterarguments articulated by the single dissenting arbitrator, who
presented the view that performing cargo work on the vessel was unlikely
when it was full of migrants since, “the delays which would be incurred
would be unacceptable to the charterers who were running a liner service on
a tight schedule.”100
Carefully walking through the relevant cases interpreting the NYPE offhire clause, the court explained that the proper inquiry was “whether the
vessel is fully efficient and capable in herself of performing the service
immediately required by the charterers.”101 Since the arbitrators concluded
that the vessel remained fully capable of performing such services, the court
found that it was not necessary for the arbitrators to even consider
causation.102 On these grounds, the court affirmed the decision of the
tribunal.103 The charterers subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the
High Court, but the matter was dismissed on grounds that the lower court
applied the proper test in analyzing the issue. Thus, the charterers were
ultimately responsible for paying hire to the shipowner throughout the
duration of the delay.104
A similar question of off-hire clause interpretation in the rescue context
was addressed in a New York arbitration award published in full form
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Id. at 502.
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Id.
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Id. at 500.
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Id. at 507.
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Id. at 508.
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C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 337
(Eng. C.A.).
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through the Society of Maritime Arbitrators.105 In Osit Shipping, Ltd. v.
Canpotex Shipping Services, Ltd. (M/V Kitsa), again, the central issue was
whether a time chartered vessel could properly be placed off-hire during the
time it deviated from its primary voyage to assist a distressed vessel in which
loss of life was imminent.106
In December 1990, the M/V Kitsa was carrying cargo from Vancouver to
Taiwan when the U.S. Coast Guard requested the M/V Kitsa change course
to render assistance to the crew of the distressed M/V Elounda Day.107 The
shipmaster of the M/V Kitsa complied with this request and safely embarked
the crew of the Elounda Day before it foundered.108 This life-saving
deviation caused the M/V Kitsa to be delayed for nearly five days.109 As a
result, the charterer subsequently refused to pay hire to the shipowner for the
lost time, and in response the shipowner brought a claim in New York
arbitration alleging the charterer still owed over USD $45,000 in hire and
bunkers consumed during the deviation.110
The charterparty at issue was a slightly amended version of the NYPE
1946 form which contained the original language of several relevant clauses,
including the unamended Clause 15 addressing off-hire.111 The charterparty
also obliged the shipmaster to prosecute the voyages with “utmost dispatch”
but granted the shipmaster the liberty to assist vessels in distress.112
The parties also included Clause 34, a “rider clause,” which supplemented
the off-hire provision through the following language:
Deviation. Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage by
reason of an accident or breakdown, or in the event of loss of
time either in port or at sea or deviation upon the course of the
voyage caused by sickness or accident to the crew or any
person on board the vessel . . . the hire shall be suspended from
the time of inefficiency until the vessel is again efficient in the
same position. . . . All expenses incurred, including bunkers
consumed during the period of suspended hire, shall be for

105

Osit Shipping, Ltd. v. Canpotex Shipping Services, Ltd. (M/V Kitsa), SMA No. 3119,
1994 WL 16780019 (Fox, Arb. Nov. 2, 1994) [hereinafter M/V Kitsa].
106
Id. at *1.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *1–2.
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owner’s account and Charterers may deduct such expenses
from hire payments.113
Through its written submissions, the shipowner raised several arguments
focusing on the language of these clauses.114 First, the shipowner argued that
notwithstanding the shipmaster’s duty to execute the voyage with utmost
dispatch, the charterparty explicitly granted the shipmaster the liberty to
deviate from the intended voyage for the purpose of saving life.115 The
shipowner supported this position by citing the U.S. statute criminalizing a
shipmaster who refuses to render assistance to other vessels in distress.116
The shipowner further argued that rescuing “strangers at sea” is not one
of the specifically enumerated off-hire events in Clause 15.117 Moreover,
applying the ejusdem generis principle, the shipowner argued, third-party
rescues should not trigger the sweep-up provision “any other cause” because
such events are not analogous to the other explicitly enumerated causes.118
Regarding Clause 34, the shipowner pointed out that it contained no explicit
language placing the vessel off-hire during a deviation for the purpose of
assisting third-party vessels and instead, only addressed deviation to assist
people who were already on board.119
The charterers, on the other hand, argued that rescuing the crew of the
Elounda Day qualified as an “other cause” captured under the sweep-up
language of Clause 15.120 They also argued that the language under Clause
34 allowing the vessel to be placed off-hire for purposes of deviation caused
by sickness or accident to “anyone on board the vessel” could be construed
as including situations in which the vessel deviates to render assistance and
ultimately embarks rescued persons onto the vessel.121 To support this
argument, the charterers drew the analogy between saving the lives of
injured crew members and rescuing third-parties, including “persons on
another sinking ship, or a downed aircraft, or marooned on an island.”122
The charterers also raised the argument that the customary and legal
obligation to assist other vessels in distress is squarely placed on the

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
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Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 2304 referenced above in supra note 31).
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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shipmaster and shipowner.123 Since the charterers are merely buyers and
sellers of goods, they argued, this legal and moral obligation does not attach
to them and therefore should not be supported at their expense.124
The majority of the arbitrators sided with the shipowner and found that
the vessel remained on-hire throughout the delay.125 First, the majority
reasoned that Clause 15 enumerates six narrow circumstances in which the
vessel may be placed off-hire and it does not include any language
addressing deviations to render assistance to other vessels or to save life.126
The majority noted that there are a variety of risks associated with the
voyage left unaddressed by the off-hire clause which are normally absorbed
by the charterers, including navigation necessary to avoid violent storms or
pirate attacks.127
Addressing the argument that a rescue could fall within the sweep-up
provision assigning “any other cause” as an off-hire event, the majority found
that rendering assistance to a third-party vessel was distinguishable from the
other listed causes, each of which “pertain to a cessation or infringement of the
physical working of the vessel.”128 Finding that “[t]here is obviously nothing
physically or operationally wrong with the working of a vessel that is able to
go to the rescue of life or property at sea,” the majority declined to agree with
the charterer’s “esoteric” interpretation of Clause 15.129
The majority further reasoned that the liberties clause granted the
shipmaster the authority to deviate for purposes of assisting distressed
vessels “without any qualification, condition or reservation for putting the
vessel off-hire for having done so.”130 Since the charterers failed to
explicitly exempt themselves from paying hire during such deviations, the
majority found that “their silence implies that they recognized this
concession as an inherent exigency of the venture for which they would
accept the cost. . . .”131 Additionally, since the parties incorporated the U.S.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act into the charterparty by reference, the majority
reasoned that this exculpates the vessel for “loss or damage arising or
resulting from . . . [a]ny deviation in saving or attempting to save life or
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Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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property at sea.”132 The majority found this combination amounted to a
“clear cut absolution” for the shipowners.133
Addressing Clause 34, the majority found that this rider provision was
only designed to capture deviations relating to the vessel and its crew and not
for deviation to provide assistance to third-party vessels.134 Thus, even
though the rescued crew of the Elounda Day were ultimately embarked onto
the Kitsa, the majority refused to accept the argument that embarkation of the
rescued persons changed the nature of the deviation to fall within those offhire events reflected in Clause 34.135 Instead, the majority found that Clause
34 was designed to address deviations “resulting from a vessel’s internal
management or operation” and held that during deviations to rescue third
parties at sea “hire continues to run.”136
The sole dissenting arbitrator disagreed and in a separate written appendix
explained that the vessel should have been placed off-hire for the time lost
during the deviation.137 The dissenting arbitrator first reasoned that the
majority misinterpreted the purpose of the liberties clause.138 He explained
that the liberties clause was designed to delineate between reasonable and
unreasonable deviations, which carries implications for bill of lading and
COGSA/ Hague Rules defenses and insurance coverage but does not directly
allocate risk between the shipowner and the charterer for purposes of hire.139
Regarding the off-hire provisions contained in Clause 15 and Clause 34,
the dissenting arbitrator expressed the view that the ejusdem generis rule
“has little, if any, bearing on the correct interpretation.”140 Instead, he took
the position that “[i]f the charterer’s use of the vessel is interrupted,
suspended or delayed by any of the stipulated causes or by ‘any other cause
preventing the full working of the vessel’ ” then the charterer can properly
place the vessel off-hire.141
The dissenting arbitrator further reasoned that the deviation to render
assistance to the Elounda Day was unlike a deviation to avoid inclement
weather because it was an “interruption not a prolongation of the vessel’s
performance in charterer’s service.”142 Since the U.S. Coast Guard ordered
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

See U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at Appendix A.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the shipmaster to render assistance to the Elounda Day, the Kitsa was
“effectively and legally removed from the charterer’s service and temporarily
pressed into a rescue effort. . . .”143
Addressing commercial fairness as a consideration, the dissenting
arbitrator explained:
[t]he immediate obligation as well as the long term benefit to
respond to ships in distress rests with the shipowning
community. Although it might sound callous, the interests of a
time charterer are financial and do not rise to the same moral or
personal level of the shipowner. However noble the cause, the
simple fact remains that the charterer’s service was interrupted
and it ought not also be required to reward the shipowner for
complying with its moral or legal obligations to its crew or that
of a fellow shipowner. That apple falls at the foot of the
owner’s not the time charterer’s tree.144
Finally, the dissenting arbitrator pointed out that it is possible in some
jurisdictions for the shipowner to seek recovery for life salvage through a
publicly administered fund and that P&I Clubs may also reimburse the
shipowner for some expenses.145 Since the owner of the Kitsa made no
attempt to recover its expenses through those mechanisms, this gave the
appearance that the shipowner instead sought to “profit from its obligations
to give aid to the Elounda Day by claiming full hire from its time
charterer.”146
A recent case out of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana also addressed the issue of hire during a rescue, albeit
indirectly.147 The dispute arose after a helicopter experiencing mechanical
problems during a flight over the Gulf of Mexico was forced to land on the
deck of the Panamax bulk carrier M/V Aeolian Heritage.148 After the
landing, the Aeolian Heritage deviated from its “otherwise scheduled path”
to take the rescued passengers and helicopter to the nearby port in Corpus
Christi, Texas.149 The shipowner brought an action under the Salvage
Convention to recover a salvage award from the helicopter owner.150
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sunglory Maritime, Ltd. v. PHI, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 618 (E.D. La. 2016).
Id. at 626–34.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 626–27.
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The shipowner alleged that the Aeolian Heritage was off-hire during the
deviation and sought to include loss of hire as part of the salvage award
calculation.151 Clause 38 of the time charterparty at issue included the
following language:
Should the vessel deviate or put back during a voyage, contrary
to the orders or directions of the Charterers, the hire is to be
suspended from the time of her deviating or putting back until
she is again in the same or equidistant position from the
destination and the voyage resumed therefrom.152
Interpreting this language without reference to any other clause in the
charterparty, the court found that the shipowner was correct that the Aeolian
Heritage was eligible to go off-hire during its deviation to bring the rescued
persons to port.153 While the court explicitly held that “an event occurred
that could have triggered Clause 38 and allowed the Vessel to go ‘off-hire,’”
because the shipowner provided no evidence that the charterer actually
invoked the off-hire clause and sought a discount for the time that it went
off-hire, the shipowner could not secure a “double payment” by recovering
loss of hire as a part of the salvage award.154
Taken together, the outcomes in the Roachbank and the Kitsa suggest that
the shipowner is in a strong position under the NYPE form when the
charterer seeks to place the vessel off-hire during a rescue-related delay.
However, the divided nature of those arbitration tribunals and the contrary
finding in the Aeolian Heritage case demonstrate that it is plausible that a
charterer could succeed in placing the vessel off-hire in certain rescue
scenarios even if the charterparty is ambiguous on the issue. To fully
explore this question, it is useful to turn to other cases addressing off-hire
issues in the context of third-party intervention.

151

Id. at 659.
Id. at 659–60 (emphasis added). It is unclear from the court’s opinion or the parties’
briefs which time charterparty form was used, but the language cited by the court is similar to
clause 17 of the NYPE 1993 form, except (perhaps crucially) it omits an internal reference to
the liberties clause. NYPE clause 17 is discussed infra in Section IV. See New York Produce
Exchange Form (1993), in COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 780–91.
153
Sunglory Maritime, Ltd. v. PHI, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 618, 660 (E.D. La. 2016).
Remarkably, the court made this finding without any discussion on whether the vessel was
prevented from full working or whether the event was a qualifying cause.
154
Id.
152
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2. Other Cases Addressing Third-Party Intervention and Off-Hire
Provisions
Due at least in part to the widespread preference for confidentially in
maritime arbitration, decisions like the Roachbank and the Kitsa directly
addressing the issue of whether the charterer owes hire during rescue-related
delays have rarely made their way into the public domain. Nonetheless,
other cases in the modern era have considered similar questions involving
delays caused by third parties that were not expressly enumerated under the
NYPE off-hire clause.155 The English courts in particular have formed a
somewhat infamous “judicial gloss” addressing some of the most challenging
issues raised by the interpretation of the NYPE off-hire clause.156 This
guidance has primarily addressed two fundamental issues: namely, what does
it mean to prevent the “full working” of the vessel? And what limits, if any,
should be applied to the sweep-up provision on causation?
Courts have examined the question of “full working” by considering
whether the vessel is “fully efficient” and “fully capable of performing the
service immediately required of her” by the charterer.157 By applying this
standard, courts have recognized a distinction between preventing the
“working” of the vessel and preventing the “use” of the vessel.158 As one
court put it, even if the vessel is prevented from continuing on the intended
voyage, the vessel will remain efficient if it is “in every way sound and well
found.”159 This determination may depend on the physical condition of the
vessel, but may also be impacted by its qualities, characteristics, history,
ownership, and other factors affecting the vessel’s legal status.160 In this
sense, “there is no distinction to be drawn between legal and physical
incapacity.”161
Framing the “full working” question in this way regrettably causes
problems of its own. There is still some division in the English courts over
whether it is possible for a barrier imposed by a third party intervention, such
155

See generally John Weale, The NYPE Off-Hire Clause and Third Party Intervention: Can
an Efficient Vessel be Placed Off-Hire?, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 133 (2002).
156
Id. at 155–57. See also C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank),
[1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 498, at 507 (Eng. C.A.) (“[T]he Courts have unquestionably put a
judicial gloss on the way in which that question of fact is to be put. . . .”).
157
Actis Co. Ltd. v. Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd (Aquacharm) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 at
240, aff’d, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 (Eng. C.A).
158
Mareva Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Canaria Armadora S.A. (Mareva AS) [1977] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep. 368 (Eng.).
159
Court Line Ltd. v. Dant & Russel Inc. (1939) 64 Li.L.Rep. 212 at 219 n.23.
160
Belcore Maritime Corp. v. F. Lli. Moretti Cereali S.p.A. (Mastro Giorgis) [1983] 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 66 at 69; see also Weale, supra note 155.
161
Belcore, supra note 160, at 67.
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as interference by port authorities, to actually prevent the full working of an
otherwise efficient ship.162 In making determinations regarding the services
“required” by the charterer, it is also unclear whether the fact finder should
apply this test using a subjective or objective standard.163 Employing a
subjective standard, the charterer’s actual preference for the vessel’s
immediate services would be given some weight, while an objective standard
may instead focus on the commercial needs ordinarily required by a time
charterer under the circumstances.
The judicial guidance addressing causation is also quite convoluted. As
discussed above, the original NYPE language is interpreted narrowly under
the ejusdem generis principle; however, even the amended sweep-up
provision modified to broaden the scope of the off-hire clause has caused
problems, with essentially two diverging views being presented. One
approach, as articulated in the Roachbank case, is to view the amended
sweep-up provision “any other cause whatsoever” as removing any
limitations on the type of cause that can place the vessel off-hire.164 This
would make the critical inquiry whether or not the vessel is prevented from
being fully worked, irrespective of the reason why. The other approach is to
view even the amended sweep-up provision as still limited to causes that are
intrinsic and not “extraneous.”165 Applying this rule, even under the
amended sweep-up provision, a qualifying cause must relate to the qualities,
characteristics, history and ownership of the vessel itself.166
Acknowledging this uncertainty, it is unsurprising that there have been
diverging results in cases analyzing off-hire issues in which the cause of
delay was some third-party intervention. In some of these cases, the
charterer failed to show that the sweep-up provision allowed the vessel to go
162

Andre & Cie S.A. v. Orient Shipping (Rotterdam) B.V. (Laconian Confidence) [1997] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 139 at 141 (Eng.) (noting “this judicial gloss has caused problems in cases where
the cause of delay is the interference of authorities operating on a vessel which is in herself
fully efficient”).
163
As one commentator has pointed out in reference to the standard “services immediately
required by the charterer”:
The problem with the word “required” is that it is ambiguous. It may convey
the sense of something that is needed, or it may mean something that is
demanded. And that raises the question whether the test articulated by the
courts is supposed to be strictly objective, or whether there may be embedded
within it a subjective element of the charterer’s discretion.
JOHN WEALE, OFF-HIRE: A STUDY 131–32 (Steamship Insure Management Services,
Ltd., 2016).
164
See C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
498, 500 (Eng. C.A.).
165
Mastro Giorgis, [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 69.
166
Id.
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off-hire. For instance, in the Aquacharm case, the charterer was unable to
place the vessel off-hire through the unamended NYPE language after the
Panama Canal Authority demanded cargo be offloaded to lighten the vessel
before allowing it to transit through the Panama Canal.167 Likewise, the
charterer in the Laconian Confidence case was unable to place the vessel offhire when the vessel was delayed for over two weeks while port authorities
determined a bureaucratic procedure for discharging cargo residue from the
previous shipment.168
In at least two other cases, however, the charterer was able to successfully
place the vessel off-hire by invoking the amended sweep-up provision to
capture causes that were not otherwise enumerated. In the Apollo, the vessel
was found to be off-hire during the time it was denied port entry because
local authorities suspected that members of the crew on board had contracted
typhus.169 Likewise, in the Mastro Giorgis case, the vessel was found to be
off-hire when cargo owners placed an arrest on the vessel after cargo on
board was damaged, which prevented the vessel from being allowed to
depart the port.170
More recently, in the wake of a surge in maritime piracy around the Horn
of Africa, two cases made their way on appeal through the English
Commercial Court involving the question of whether a vessel is off-hire
during lost time caused by a pirate seizure. In COSCO Bulk Carrier Co.,
Ltd. v. Team-Up Owning Co. Ltd., a Panamax bulk carrier called the
Saldanha was attacked by Somali pirates while traveling through the transit
corridor in the Gulf of Aden.171 The vessel was taken to the waters off the
coast of Somalia and remained under the pirates’ control for a period of two
and a half months during the spring of 2009.172 The vessel had a hire rate of
over USD $52,000 per day and upon release of the vessel after a ransom was
paid, the charterers refused to pay any hire for the period the vessel was
controlled by the pirates.173
The Saldanha was fixed under the NYPE 1946 form, containing the
original Clause 15 off-hire language.174 The charterers made three arguments
under this language. First, the charterers argued that the detention by the
167

Aquacharm, [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237, 240 (Eng. C.A).
Andre & Cie S.A. v. Orient Shipping Rotterdam B.V. (Laconian Confidence) [1997] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 139.
169
Sidermar S.p.A v. Apollo Corp. (Apollo) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 200 at 200, 205.
170
Mastro Giorgis, [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 66.
171
COSCO Bulk Carrier Co., Ltd. v. Team-Up Owning Co. Ltd (Saldanha) [2010] EWHC
1340 (Comm), [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 187, 187.
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Id.
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Id. at 189.
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Id.
168

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

4/27/2018 3:47 PM

2018] THE “REFUGEE CLAUSE” FOR COMMERCIAL SHIPPING CONTRACTS 431

pirates amounted to “[d]etention by average accidents to ship or cargo.”175
Second, they argued that negligent errors in navigation amounted to
“[d]efault and/or deficiency of men.”176 Finally, they argued that the seizure
by the pirates was an “other cause” captured by the original sweep-up
provision.177 While the arbitrators did find the vessel was prevented from
“full working,” the charterers were unable to show that pirate detention was a
qualifying cause.178
On appeal, the English Commercial Court affirmed the arbitration award
and held that charterers had not met the burden of showing the pirate attack
was an event that brought the vessel under the off-hire clause.179 The court
affirmed the finding because no physical damage was caused to the vessel
and the pirate attack was not akin to other forms of “average accidents to
ship or cargo” that typically occur in the shipping industry.180 The court also
affirmed the holding that “default and/or deficiency of men” was only
intended to capture situations in which the crew refused to perform duties,
rather than any negligent performance of those duties.181
The court also upheld the finding that a pirate seizure could not be
designated as “any other cause.”182 The charterers had submitted that the
sweep-up provision would encapsulate piracy-related delays if interpreted
within the context of its overriding purpose to prevent disputes based on
“nice distinctions.”183 The court, however, pointed out that the sweep-up
provision at issue did not include the amendment “whatsoever” and therefore
could not be used to capture extraneous events different than those
enumerated because the ejusdem generis rule applied.184 Holding that a
pirate attack is a “classic example” of an event falling outside the scope of
the sweep-up provision because it is “totally extraneous,” the court affirmed
the arbitrators’ decision that the vessel remained on-hire throughout the
pirate detention.185
Critically, the court in the Saldanha case also made the practical point
that if parties wish to include piracy as an off-hire event, they should do so
175

Id.
Id. at 191.
177
Id. at 192.
178
Id. at 188.
179
Id. at 194. Note that the shipowners did not appeal the arbitration tribunal’s finding that
the vessel had been prevented from “full working.” Id. at 188.
180
Id. at 189–92.
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Id. at 191–92.
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Id. at 192–94.
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Id. at 193.
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Id. at 192–94.
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Id. at 193–94.
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plainly and in clear terms through unambiguous language.186 The court
wrote, “[s]hould parties be minded to treat seizures by pirates as an off-hire
event under a time charterparty, they can do so straightforwardly and most
obviously by way of an express provision. . . .”187
While the Saldanha case was recognized as an important case “crossing
the threshold from the private realm of arbitration into a public judgment at
first instance,”188 another similar case made its way to the court only two
years later. In Osmium Shipping Corporation v. Cargill International SA
(Captain Stefanos), again the dispute concerned the issue of whether a time
chartered vessel was on or off-hire during a period in which it was controlled
by pirates.189
The Panamax bulk carrier, the Captain Stefanos, was carrying coal from
South Africa to Italy when it was attacked by pirates in the Indian Ocean as it
headed towards the Suez Canal.190 The vessel was detained for more than
two months, and after its release, a dispute arose between the shipowners and
the charterers about whether hire was owed during the pirate seizure.191
Like in Saldanha, there was apparently no dispute that the presence of the
pirates on board prevented the full working of the vessel. However, the legal
issue was slightly different because the Captain Stefanos charterparty
included a rider clause, which added substance to the original off-hire
clause.192 The relevant portion of the rider clause read as follows:
Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage by reason of any
accident or breakdown, or in the event of loss of time either in
port or at sea or deviation upon the course of the voyage caused
by . . . capture/ seizure, or detention or threatened detention by
any authority including arrest, the hire shall be suspended from
the time of the inefficiency until the vessel is again efficient in
the same or equidistant position in Charterers’ option, and
voyage resumed therefrom.193
The arbitrators found that this rider clause was specific enough to allow
the charterers to bring the events within the clause and therefore suspend hire
186

Id. at 194.
Id.
188
Id.
189
Osmium Shipping Corp. v. Cargill Int’l SA (Captain Stefanos), [2012] EWHC 571
(Comm), [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 46, 46 (Eng.).
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Id.
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Id. (emphasis added).
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during the time the vessel was detained by pirates.194 On appeal, the English
Commercial Court affirmed the award, reasoning that the arbitrators had
reached this conclusion by properly considering the language of the clause
and its grammar, syntax, and punctuation. Since the off-hire clause dealt
specifically with capture, seizure and detention, the charterers met their
burden in showing the circumstances amounted to an off-hire event.195 Thus,
although the Saldanha and Captain Stefanos cases were similar on the facts,
the revised off-hire language used in the latter case produced a contrasting
result.
While the cases discussed here do not directly speak to the issue of
rescue-related delays, they bring to the surface the interpretation problems
that courts and arbitrators encounter when similarly applying NYPE off-hire
language to facts involving outside intervention. The “full working”
standard articulated by these cases is remarkably high, and a charterer may
find it difficult to establish that a rescue operation or related delay does in
fact prevent the vessel from being “fully capable of performing the service
immediately required.”196 Surprisingly, however, in both the Saldanha and
Captain Stefanos cases, there was no dispute that the vessel had been
prevented from full working, which suggests that the curiously strict
“judicial gloss” on the issue may not be a total barrier to a charterer’s
argument. But even if “full working” is interpreted more liberally, these
cases still demonstrate that express language is the preferred way to expand
off-hire scenarios rather than relying on the inconsistently interpreted sweep
up language “any other cause” or “any other cause whatsoever.” While
specific decisions about how to modify the off-hire clause would be left to
negotiations subject to the bargaining positions of the parties, as is
demonstrated by the diverging results in the Saldanha and Captain Stefanos
cases, it is these minor changes that can make all the difference.
IV. ALLOCATION OF RESCUE COSTS THROUGH REVISED CHARTERPARTY
TERMS
The above discussion demonstrates that it is in the best interest of parties
with an economic stake in a maritime venture to ensure the costs of rescue
operations are clearly allocated. Particularly when the voyage involves
transit through waters subject to a period of mass maritime migration, such
as is occurring at present in the Mediterranean Sea, it is prudent for
194
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Id. at 52–53.
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See Actis Co. Ltd. v. Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (Aquacharm), [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
237, 240; 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 (Eng. C.A).
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commercial shipping contracts to reflect the enhanced likelihood of disputes
over rescue-related costs. Unfortunately, the standard boilerplate language
contained in the most widely used time charterparty forms is inadequate to
resolve such issues. Consequently, it may be necessary for parties to adopt
more precise and explicit language when allocating rescue-related costs.
Determining what language to include and whether it is feasible for
modifications of this kind to be widely adopted are separate questions that
warrant further exploration below.
A. Drafting an Effective “Refugee Clause”
Rather than leaving courts and arbitrators to determine who bears rescuerelated costs by applying contract language that is silent or ambiguous on the
issue, those with a commercial interest in the voyage should ensure
charterparties contain language that specifically addresses these questions of
liability. Naturally, however, shipowners and charterers would approach the
negotiation of such clauses from adverse perspectives. For any direct costs
arising out of rescue operations, including additional fuel, supplies, food, and
wages, both the shipowner and the charterer would want to shift such costs
onto the other party by express contract language. The indirect costs, such as
loss of hire during periods of delay, would be more complicated.
One approach to drafting a shipowner-friendly provision would be to
grant the shipmaster the liberty to deviate for rescue-related activities
through a standard liberties clause and then expressly exclude such
deviations as an off-hire event. Under its original Clause 16 language, the
NYPE 1946 form grants the shipmaster the liberty to deviate to assist other
vessels and save lives, but the clause is silent on whether such a deviation
has implications for hire.197 While the shipowner successfully convinced the
arbitrators that the vessel should remain on hire in both the Roachbank and
Kitsa cases discussed above, this would not necessarily be the result in every
case in interpreting the NYPE 1946 form, particularly if the presence of
rescued persons prevents the vessel from safe operation.
A more explicit approach to handling the hire implications of the liberty
to deviate is employed by the new NYPE 2015 form jointly authored by
BIMCO, the Association of Shipbrokers and Agents, and the Singapore
Maritime Foundation.198 The NYPE 2015 form includes a liberties clause
that is unchanged from the 1946 version reading, “[t]he Vessel shall have the
liberty to sail with or without pilots, to tow and be towed, to assist vessels in
197
198

See COGHLIN ET AL, supra note 15, at 776.
See BIMCO, ASBA & SMF, supra note 16, at 3.
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distress, and to deviate for the purpose of saving life and property.”199
Referencing the liberties clause, the separate off-hire clause reads in relevant
part:
Should the Vessel deviate or put back during a voyage,
contrary to the orders or directions of the Charterers, for any
reason other than accident to the cargo or where permitted in
Clause 22 (Liberties) hereunder, the hire to be suspended from
the time of her deviating or putting back until she is again in
the same or equidistant position from the destination and the
voyage resumed therefrom.200
By tying together the liberties clause with the off-hire clause by reference,
this NYPE 2015 language protects the shipowner by excluding life-saving
deviations as off-hire events. While a better approach for the shipowner may
be for the charterparty to expressly read that the vessel “shall remain on hire
during any deviation permitted in the Liberties Clause,” the NYPE 2015
language is nevertheless more complete and explicit on this issue than the
popular but nebulous NYPE 1946 form.
The NYPE 2015 language, however, would not be acceptable to a
charterer who enjoys a strong bargaining position and is concerned about
rescue-related costs. A more charterer-friendly clause would therefore
involve a different approach. Since a shipmaster is legally bound to assist
vessels in distress, a charterer could not enforce a provision unconscionably
preventing the shipmaster from rendering such assistance.201 However, the
charterer could still negotiate contractual language protecting its financial
interests in a rescue scenario.202 To do so, the charterer could continue to
199

Id. at 16, cl. 22.
Id. at 15, cl. 17 (emphasis added). Note that Clause 22 of the NYPE 1993 form uses
similar language referencing the lines of the liberties clause (lines 257 to 258) within the offhire clause:
Should the Vessel deviate or put back during a voyage, contrary to the orders
or directions of the Charterers, for any reason other than accident to the
cargo or where permitted in [lines 257 to 258] hereunder, the hire is to be
suspended from the time of her deviating or putting back until she is again in
the same or equidistant position from the destination and the voyage resumed
therefrom.
Id. (emphasis added); see also COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 780–91.
201
See infra Section III.
202
See Martin Davies, Obligations and Implications for Ships Encountering Persons in
Need of Assistance at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 109, 137 (2003) (“[I]t is quite possible
for a charterer to bargain that the presence of refugees puts the ship off-hire if that is what it
wants, although it may have to pay a little more by way of hire in return.”); see, e.g., Whistler
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grant the shipmaster the liberty to deviate to render assistance, but
simultaneously make such deviations subject to an obligation of the
shipowner to absorb the associated costs. This may be accomplished by
placing language in the liberty to deviate clause expressly indemnifying the
charterer for the costs of additional bunkers and others liabilities arising out
of assistance to other vessels. Regarding the critical issue of hire, the
charterer could include rescue-related deviations as an explicit off-hire event,
similar to the charterer’s approach on piracy in the Captain Stefanos case. In
doing so, the charterer might also tie this language together with the liberties
clause to clarify that the two clauses are not in conflict.
For example, a charterer-friendly off-hire clause might read:
Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage in the event of
loss of time either in port or at sea or deviation upon the course
of the voyage caused by rendering assistance to other vessels
and delivering rescued persons to a place of safety, including
any deviations permitted in the Liberties Clause hereunder, the
hire shall be suspended from the time of the inefficiency until
the vessel is again efficient in the same or equidistant position
in Charterers’ option and voyage resumed therefrom.
For the charterer, this approach would be much preferred to strained
arguments relying on problematic sweep-up provisions like the ones which
proved ineffective for the charterers in both the Roachbank and the Kitsa
cases.203

Int’l Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (Hill Harmony), [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 147147 (HL)
for a clause referencing the presences of “refugees” as an off-hire event:
55. In the event of loss of time [either in port or at sea, deviation from the
course of the voyage or putting back whilst on voyage,] caused by [sickness
of or an accident to or misconduct by Master/Officers/crew, or refugees or
any person on board the vessel other than persons travelling by request of
Charterers or by] reason of the refusal of Master or Officers or crew to
perform their duties [or of an accident or breakdown to vessel or drydocking,]
the hire shall be suspended [from the time of inefficiency in port or at sea,
deviation or putting back until vessel is again in the same position or
equidistant position from the destination, and voyage resumed therefrom,
and] direct expenses incurred including bunkers consumed during such
period of suspension shall be for Owners’ account.
Id.
203
Professor Davies has offered the following alternative to the problematic sweep-up
provision: “In the event of the loss of time from any cause depriving the charterer of the
immediate and effective disposition of the ship, the payment of hire and overtime, if any, shall
cease for the time thereby lost.” See Davies, supra note 85, at 112.
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Due to the competing interests between the shipowner and charterer, a
compromise involving cost sharing would be the most equitable solution
(although the bargaining position of the parties and market conditions are
likely to be the most influential factors in determining what language is
ultimately used). With this concept of compromise in mind, at least one
insurer has put forth a model clause designed to achieve a 50/50 split
between shipowners and charterers of certain rescue-related costs. The UK
Defence Club, in its 2015 publication “Deviation to Save Life at Sea”
proposed the following “draft refugee clause”:
In the event of the ship deviating for the purpose of saving
human life (other than crew members / the owners’ personnel),
or for the purpose of participating in search & rescue
operations (as instructed by the ship’s flag administration or
coastal state authorities), all costs, liabilities and expenses
excluding the payment of hire and bunkers consumed shall be
split 50/50 between the owners and the charterers [in the event
that they are irrecoverable from the relevant authorities]. The
phrase ‘all costs liabilities and expenses’ shall, for the purpose
of this clause, include:
a) All telecommunication costs, crew bonuses and
overtime and port costs including anchorage, pilot, tug
and other costs incurred;
b) All water, food, stores, fuel and equipment consumed
or used to rescue, care for and disembark the refugees;
c) All stores and equipment consumed or used and
related costs (such as garbage disposal or third party
cleaning costs) or any repairs to the ship to return the
ship to the same condition she was in before the
deviation; and
d) All liabilities to third parties, including liabilities for
injuries suffered by the ship’s Master, crew or third
parties, except where the liability is caused by the
negligence of the Master or crew or a failure to exercise
due diligence to maintain or make the ship seaworthy.204
The above clause could reduce some of the uncertainty regarding who
bears rescue-related losses by promoting cost sharing for many of the
204

Deviation to Save Life at Sea, UK DEF. CLUB 1, 3 (July 2015), https://www.ukdefence.
com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-defence/Photos/Publications/Soundings/UKDC-Soundings-June-20
15-Deviation-save-life-vW.pdf.
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associated liabilities. The clause equitably distributes a variety of “costs,
liabilities and expenses” between the shipowner and charterer, expressly
addressing some of the more substantial risks such as fuel consumed during
rescue, repairs to the vessel, and personal injury arising out of rescue
operations.
Significantly, however, the clause contains explicit language “excluding
the payment of hire and bunkers consumed” from the 50/50 split.205 As a
result, the question of hire cannot be answered by the clause itself and would
therefore be governed by a separate off-hire clause. For shipowners and
charterers attempting to achieve a true 50/50 split of rescue costs, the parties
should omit this exclusion and instead explicitly address hire. Without
addressing such issues, costly disputes may still arise.
Another potentially problematic feature of the UK Defence Club clause is
that it does not comprehensively address the scope of the shipmaster’s
obligation to coordinate in ensuring rescued persons are delivered to a place
of safety. While the clause does apply the 50/50 split to deviation “for the
purpose of participating in search & rescue operations (as instructed by the
ship’s flag administration or coastal state authorities)”206 it is unclear whether
logistical delays linked to determining an appropriate place of
disembarkation are within the scope of costs contemplated by the clause.
This is particularly important because, as demonstrated by the reaction of the
coastal authorities in the Roachbank case, substantial delays may result from
resistance to migrant disembarkation.207 Since the SAR Convention requires
shipmasters to coordinate with state RCCs to deliver rescued persons to a
place of safety a commercial vessel could face substantial delays if a place of
disembarkation cannot be determined quickly.208
It is also important to recognize that the most effective “refugee clause”
will not mention the word “refugee” at all. “Refugee” is a term of art with a
technical legal meaning under international humanitarian law, which could
ultimately impact how the clause would be interpreted. The UK Defence Club
clause reads, “ ‘all costs, liabilities and expenses’ shall, . . . include . . . [a]ll
water, food, stores, fuel and equipment consumed or used to rescue, care for
and disembark the refugees . . . .”209 This language may lend itself to technical

205

Id.
Id.
207
The infamous M/V Tampa incident off the coast of Australia is perhaps the most high
profile example of a commercial delay directly caused by the attitude of coastal authorities
after a migrant rescue. For a discussion of commercial implications arising out of that
incident, see Davies, supra note 202.
208
SAR Convention, supra note 25, ¶ 1.3.2.
209
See Deviation to Save Life at Sea, supra note 204.
206
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arguments dependent on whether the rescued persons can successfully
demonstrate their status as individuals entitled to refugee protection.
Designation of refugee status generally requires an investigation by state
immigration officials concerned with whether the individual can establish a
well-founded fear of persecution in the state of origin, as required under
treaties such as the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.210 Since contemporary maritime migration tends to be characterized
by “mixed” populations that include both refugees and economic migrants
who may not be able to establish refugee status, such technicalities could limit
the effect of contract clauses using this language.211 A better clause would use
the phrase “rescued persons” rather than “refugees.”212
While parties are free to draft language to distribute rescue-related costs
however they see fit under freedom of contract principles, it would be of
substantial commercial value for industry organizations to develop model
clauses for easy adoption by shipowners and charterers. There is in fact wide
precedence for this as organizations such as BIMCO, Intertanko, and others
have historically endorsed a number of new charterparty clauses for different
purposes, some of which relate to migration issues. For example, BIMCO
has published multiple iterations of a “Stowaways Clause” designed to
allocate responsibility between shipowners and charterers for fines, delays,
and other costs of disembarking stowaways who gain access to the vessel
without authorization.213 This precedent highlights the question of whether it
is now appropriate and feasible for a model refugee/rescue clause to be
recommended by industry organizations to more explicitly address largescale rescue costs, particularly addressing the contentious issues of deviation
and hire discussed above.
B. Model Charterparty Clauses Arising out of Contemporary Maritime
Challenges: Piracy as a Lesson
Wholesale modifications to widely used charterparty forms have occurred
periodically to better reflect contemporary commercial practices (NYPE has
been revised six times), yet the shipping industry has generally been resistant
210

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3, Jul. 28, 1951, 1954 U.N.T.S. 152.
See Marina Sharpe, Mixed Up: International Law and the Meaning(s) of “Mixed
Migration,” 37 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 116, 120 (2018).
212
An equivalent clause capturing the nature of the current maritime migration patterns
might instead employ the following language: “ ‘all costs liabilities and expenses’
shall, . . . include . . . [a]ll water, food, stores, fuel and equipment consumed or used to rescue,
care for and disembark any rescued persons.”
213
BIMCO, Special Circular No. 1, Stowaways Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009 (Jan.
2010) (on file with author).
211
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to the adoption of these comprehensive revisions.214 Despite this reluctance
to change, the industry response to the modern maritime piracy problems
provides insight into the feasibility of rapid contract modifications to meet
pressing maritime challenges. As discussed above, pirate attacks targeting
commercial vessels began occurring with alarming regularity in the Gulf of
Aden between 2008 and 2012.215 At its peak in 2010, commercial vessels
were attacked on an almost daily basis, terrorizing professional seafarers and
also creating substantial economic losses across the shipping industry.216
As hijacked vessels were often detained for months on end while ransom
payments were negotiated, the resulting economic losses created commercial
disputes, such as the Saldanha and the Captain Stefanos cases discussed
above in Section III.217 Prior to this piracy crisis, most time charterparties,
including those using the NYPE 1946 form, were silent on many of the
relevant legal issues. These included whether the vessel is off-hire during
the time the vessel is attacked or seized by pirates, whether the master has
the liberty to choose an alternative route to avoid areas at risk for piracy, who
is responsible to pay for additional security on the vessel, and how other
liabilities should be apportioned, such as personal injury to the crew, marine
pollution, wreck removal, and premiums for kidnap and ransom insurance.
Recognizing this problem, in 2009 BIMCO and other industry
organizations began publishing model clauses for time charterparties that
specifically address piracy-related liabilities.218 BIMCO in particular
initially drafted its piracy clause with the express objective “to consolidate
into a single provision the contractual position of the parties in relation to the
threat of piracy.”219 After publication of the first iteration of the piracy
clause, some industry participants claimed the language was too favorable to
shipowners.220 Fearing that a one-sided clause would not be widely adopted
in practice, BIMCO put together a working group to carefully consider the
various positions of industry stakeholders who were invited to contribute
with comments.221 The result was a revised piracy clause addressing a
variety of related risks by more equitably splitting some of the most
214

See Todd, supra note 10.
Jonathan Bellish et al., The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012, Oceans Beyond
Piracy (2013), http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%20Full%2
0Report_3.pdf.
216
Id.
217
See infra Section III.
218
BIMCO, Special Circular No. 2, BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009
(Nov. 2009) (on file with author).
219
Id. at 1.
220
Id. at 1–2.
221
Id. at 2–4.
215
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significant liabilities between shipowners and charterers.222 Again, in 2013,
BIMCO revised its piracy clause “to ensure that the provisions remain in line
with commercial requirements.”223
The current iteration, the BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties
2013, includes provisions addressing a number of piracy-related liabilities.224
These include granting the master the liberty to take appropriate precautions
when navigating through an area exposed to a high risk of piracy and
assigning charterers with the obligation to pay any additional insurance
premium imposed by the shipowner’s insurers as a result of the vessel
navigating in an area of enhanced risk.225 On the contentious issue of
whether the vessel would remain on hire during a pirate attack or seizure, the
clause contains the following language:
(e) If the Vessel is attacked by pirates any time lost shall be for
the account of the Charterers and the Vessel shall remain on
hire.
(f) If the Vessel is seized by pirates the Owners shall keep the
Charterers closely informed of the efforts made to have the
Vessel released. The Vessel shall remain on hire throughout
the seizure and the Charterers’ obligations shall remain
unaffected, except that hire payments shall cease as of the
ninety-first (91st) day after the seizure until release.226
This language prevents a piracy attack or seizure from being construed as
an off-hire event but effectively caps the payment of hire at ninety days from
the time the vessel is initially seized. While the language still appears to
favor shipowners by making the charterer initially liable for hire during
piracy-related delays, BIMCO has taken the position that this ninety day cap
on hire “represents a sharing of the risk” between charterers and
shipowners.227 A more cynical view is that the ninety-day cap simply
reflects the average time period that a vessel is held by pirates, which would
in effect make the charterer liable for hire during the whole of most pirate
seizures.228 Nevertheless, BIMCO has explained that the cap is designed

222

Id.
BIMCO, Special Circular No. 7, Revised Piracy Clauses, BIMCO (July 19, 2009) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Revised Piracy Clauses].
224
Id.
225
Id. at 2.
226
Id. at 4.
227
Id. at 2.
228
See G. Hunter, BIMCO Piracy Clauses, 15 J. INT’L MAR. L. 291, 292 (2009).
223

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

442

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

4/27/2018 3:47 PM

[Vol. 46:403

only to be “a starting point and parties are free to negotiate a figure which
meets their specific needs.”229
It is unclear how widespread BIMCO piracy clauses have been adopted in
practice. However, the 2013 iteration was incorporated into BIMCO’s most
recent comprehensive charterparty revision, the NYPE 2015 form. It is too
early to measure whether NYPE 2015 will become an industrial standard
rivaling NYPE 1946. Observers have submitted that the new form is more
likely to become fodder for contractual “cherry-picking” than wholesale
adoption by industry participants.230 Although adoption of the full revised
form may be preferred for the sake of contract continuity, which may relieve
courts and arbitrators of the headaches induced by sloppy amendments to
existing forms, including bespoke or cherry-picked language within the
charterparty that directly addresses the risks of contemporary maritime
challenges, it is better than simply remaining silent on these issues.
Regardless of how widespread these clauses have been adopted, the
industry response to the maritime piracy crisis by quickly developing new
charterparty language offers insight into the feasibility of rapid contract
modification reacting to new developments. This sense of urgency exhibited
in response to piracy suggests there is hope for mobilizing a similar reaction
to the current search and rescue crisis in the Mediterranean Sea by updating
inadequate charterparty language.
In drawing any analogies between piracy and search and rescue for
purposes of drafting contract language, it must first be acknowledged that
there are some fundamental differences in the way commercial actors are
impacted by these two separate crises. In practice, delays created by a pirate
hijacking are likely to be longer in duration than delays caused by a rescue
operation (although this would, of course, depend on the specific situation).
Furthermore, in a pirate hijacking scenario, it may be easier to sympathize
with the shipowner whose vessel and crew are subjected to an enhanced risk
of physical danger at least in part because the charterer presumably directed
the master to proceed to a destination requiring navigation through unsafe
waters. Thus, to some degree, it is sensible to contractually assign the
charterer the responsibility to indemnify the shipowner for piracy-related
liabilities, including the obligation to pay hire for at least part of the duration
of a vessel seizure. This is perhaps why the BIMCO piracy clauses, despite
undergoing multiple revisions, still overwhelmingly favor the shipowner’s
position.

229
230

Revised Piracy Clauses, supra note 223, at 2.
See Todd, supra note 10, at 318–19.
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In the rescue context, however, it is not so easy to sympathize with the
position of the shipowner at the expense of the charterer. International law
ultimately places the obligation to rescue squarely on the shipmaster, who, in
the charterparty context, is the agent of the shipowner, not the charterer.
Consequently, when the shipmaster deviates from the contractual route to
render aid to a distressed vessel in compliance with international legal
obligations, this is no fault of the charterer.231 As was convincingly pointed
out by the dissenting arbitrator in the M/V Kitsa case, the legal obligation to
render assistance to distressed vessels fundamentally rests with the
shipowning community, and it would therefore be a peculiar result for the
charterer to “reward” the shipowner for the shipmaster’s compliance with
humanitarian duties.232 While shipowners and charterers are of course free to
negotiate the terms of charterparties in a way that places the financial burden
of rescues on the charterer, considering the equities is a reasonable starting
point for such negotiations.
Even acknowledging the differences between the piracy and rescue
contexts, some charterparty revisions addressed in the BIMCO piracy clauses
can still serve as a model for drafting a useful rescue clause. Provisions
resolving uncertainty over liability for deviation, hire, bunkers, insurance,
and others are fundamental in both contexts. By recognizing the likelihood of
disputes involving these particular issues at the outset of commercial
voyages and by amending the charterparty language to answer relevant
questions of liability, industry stakeholders can certainly learn from the
piracy crisis to mobilize a similarly urgent response to contract revisions in
the search and rescue context.
V. CONCLUSION
As of this writing in the final months of 2017, the Mediterranean Sea is
still very much in the throes of a search and rescue crisis.233 The year 2016
was the deadliest on record for migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, and the
tragic trend of mass drownings has continued in 2017.234 Reportedly,
however, the heavy rescue burden initially placed on commercial vessels in
2014–2015 has diminished slightly due to enhanced search and rescue
initiatives conducted by state coast guards, regional security forces, and

232
233
234

See M/V Kitsa, supra note 105.
See IOM, Mediterranean Update, supra note 1.
Id.
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volunteer humanitarian organizations.235 Yet the sustainability of these
alternatives remains questionable.
Recent news out of Italy in particular suggests coastal authorities may
become less receptive to disembarkation of rescued persons at its ports.236
Such resistance could prolong delays as rescuing vessels seek to deliver
rescued persons to a place of safety in accordance with obligations arising
under the SAR Convention.237 The role of volunteer humanitarian
organizations conducting rescues in the Mediterranean is also being
scrutinized, calling into question the stability of their contributions.238 In
summer of 2017, several of these organizations, including Médecins Sans
Frontières, which had deployed specialized rescue vessels in the
Mediterranean Sea in recent years, suspended operations due to increasingly
dangerous interactions with the Libyan coast guard.239 These are worrying
developments for the shipping industry, signaling the burden and scope of
commercial vessel demands for rescue operations could again increase in the
near future. Commercial stakeholders must therefore continue to prepare for
the seemingly inevitable calls for contributions in the Mediterranean Sea
(and perhaps elsewhere).240
235

See Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, supra note 1.
See Europe Migrant Crisis: Italy Threatens to Close Ports as Ministers Meet, BBC (July
2, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40470102; James Politi, Italy Threatens to
Block Foreign Boats with Migrants from Ports, FIN. TIMES (June 28, 2017) (“If Italy follows
through on its threat, it could affect the work of several non-governmental organisations and
non-Italian merchant vessels performing rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea.”).
237
See SAR Convention, supra note 25, §§ 1.3.2, 2.1.9.
238
Italy Impounds NGO Rescue Ship and Sends Navy Patrol Boat to Libya, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/02/italy-impounds-ngo-rescue-sh
ip-sends-navy-patrol-boat-to-libya-migrant-refugee-route-europe; Italy Seizes NGO Rescue Boat
for Allegedly Aiding Illegal Migration, STRAITS TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.straitstimes.
com/world/europe/italy-seizes-ngo-rescue-boat-for-allegedly-aiding-illegal-migration; Anna
Momigliano, Aid Groups Say Italy is Forcing Them to Stop Rescuing Migrants at Sea, WASH.
POST (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/15/aid-gr
oups-say-italy-is-forcing-them-to-stop-rescuing-migrants-at-sea/?utm_term=.0740536502d0.
239
See Gavin Jones, More NGOs Follow MSF in Suspending Mediterranean Migrant Rescues,
REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-ngo-idUSKCN1
AT0IZ; Jon Henley & Angela Giuffrida, Three NGOs Halt Mediterranean Migrant Rescues
After Libyan Hostility, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
17/aug/14/three-ngos-halt-mediterranean-migrant-rescues-after-libyan-hostility; Yannis
Behrakis, Spanish Migrant Rescue Ship Threatened by Libyan Coastguard: Witness, REUTERS
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-ngo/spanish-migrantrescue-ship-threatened-by-libyan-coastguard-witness-idUSKCN1AV20Q.
240
Deadly trends in mass maritime migration have also continued in Asia and even Latin
America raising concerns about SAR capacity in those regions. See, South-east Asia: Mixed
Maritime Movements, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (June 2015), http://www.
refworld.org/docid/55e6c1994.html; see also Nicholas Casey, Hungry Venezuelans Flee in Boats
to Escape Economic Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
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While the recent crisis has highlighted the important role of private ships
in supporting global SAR functions, industry stakeholders are correct in
asserting that the legal framework imposing affirmative rescue duties on
commercial shipmasters was not designed to deal with a problem of the
present scale.241 In fulfilling its role in the context of frequent large-scale
rescues, commercial shipmasters and crews take on incredible risks and
shipping interests incur substantial financial losses. Since no functioning
mechanism exists to reimburse these expenses, it is the shipping interests and
their insurers who absorb rescue costs pursuant to their commercial
arrangements.
The NYPE 1946 charterparty form, despite its flaws, continues to serve as
an industry standard with perceived reliability. Unfortunately, the problems
explored above demonstrate how even trusted forms may be largely
inadequate in allocating rescue costs. By recognizing the deficiency of
standard clauses, shipping interests should consider contract modifications
that more specifically and predictably allocate rescue costs. Such changes,
however, require an awareness of the very real losses that can arise out of
rescue operations and an understanding that these risks are important enough
to diverge from long-trusted boilerplate contract language.
Some stakeholders have encouraged contracting parties to include rider
clauses rectifying this problem but few have offered any specific guidance.
It would therefore be of significant assistance for industry organizations,
such as BIMCO or others, to consider publishing model clauses to support
commercial players in developing language to more adequately allocate
rescue costs. The success of employing model clauses to allocate risks in
other contexts, including rapidly emerging problems such as piracy,
demonstrate the feasibility for contracts to be quickly amended in response to
dynamic maritime challenges.
Drafting model clauses is of course a formidable challenge in itself and
should involve careful deliberation with industry participants.
As
demonstrated by the result in the Roachbank and Kitsa cases, despite the
ambiguity of standard forms, the status quo is more likely (although not
certainly) to favor the shipowner position.242 Consequently, it may be
charterers who must push for favorable contract modifications.

25/world/americas/hungry-venezuelans-flee-in-boats-to-escape-economic-collapse.html?mcubz
=0.
241
Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, supra note 1 (“[W]hile shipping companies will always
meet their humanitarian and legal responsibilities to come to the rescue of anyone in distress
at sea, the obligations contained in the IMO SOLAS and SAR Conventions were never
intended to address this unprecedented situation.”).
242
See infra Section III.
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Nevertheless, both shipowners and charterers would benefit from clear and
predictable language precisely allocating rescue risk. Leaving such issues to
be governed by the void of contractual silence will likely lead to costly
disputes.
Rescue costs, exotic as they seem, are just another type of risk that those
involved in maritime voyages have always had to anticipate. While uniquely
springing from humanitarian roots, rescue-related delays are not so different
than those caused by chancing upon inclement weather, pirates, or incidents
of war. During periods of mass migration at sea, when the likelihood of
expensive rescues is enhanced, contracting parties should recognize this risk
as they do others, by seriously evaluating potential losses and negotiating
terms containing clear allocations of liability. In developing such language,
these negotiations carry implications beyond risk sharing or business
pragmatism—they reflect noble efforts to commercially facilitate an ancient
custom motivated by the impulse to preserve human life at whatever the cost.

